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In postwar Japan, the public policy to promote housing provision was served mainly by the three 
institutions established in the １９５０s: the Government Housing Loan CorporationGHLC, the 
municipality-managed Public Housing System and the Japan Housing Corporation. However, from 
the mid-１９９０s onward, remarkable changes in housing policies began to appear. The changes include 
a drastic restructuring of the existing system and institutions.
This paper, focusing on the government' s plan to abolish GHLC, provides a critique of the 
restructuring in Japan' s housing finance policy. First, we discuss the background against which the 
changes in housing finance policy are concerned: financial deregulation and bad loan problems. 
Secondly, we describe the government' s plan to abolish GHLC, and thirdly, examine this plan' s 
actual implications and possible consequences. Lastly, we raise an alternative perspective for 
desirable reforms of housing finance policy.
 Introduction: Restructuring of Japan's housing policy
In postwar Japan, the public policy to promote housing provision was served mainly by the three 
institutions: The Government Housing Loan CorporationGHLC, financing the middle class to buy 
homes, was established in １９５０. The municipality-managed Public Housing System, providing the 
lower-income class with rented houses, was established in １９５１. The Japan Housing Corporation, 
providing the residents of large cities with houses for rent and sale, was established in １９５５ and 
afterwards merged into the Housing and Urban Development Corporation in １９８１. However, from the 
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drastic restructuring of the existing system and institutions.
Upon revising the Public Housing Law in １９９６, the upper-income limit for tenants of public 
housing was lowered, while the government curtailed its subsidies for public housing construction. 
These measures led to increasing residualization in the provision of public housing. In １９９９, the 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation was abolished and replaced with the Urban 
Development Corporation, which began to withdraw from housing provision. In ２０００, the 
government introduced deregulation into the Housing Lease Law. It led to the weakened protection of 
tenant' s right to privately rented houses. In ２００４, the Urban Development Corporation was abolished 
and replaced with the Urban Renaissance Agency supporting mainly urban redevelopment business . 

And now, the government is planning to abolish GHLC and replace it with a new corporation ' the 
Housing Finance Agency'  dealing exclusively in securitization business on bank housing loans. 
Overall, this ongoing restructuring is in accordance with a principle that housing policy has to be 
limited to supplementing the market operation. This is the neo-liberalist doctrine to support both 
privatization and deregulation in Japan' s housing policies.
This paper, focusing on the government' s plan to abolish GHLC, provides a critique of the 
restructuring in Japan' s housing finance policy. First, we briefly discuss the background against 
which the changes in housing finance policy are concerned: financial deregulation and bad loan 
problems. Secondly, we describe the government' s plan to abolish GHLC, and thirdly, examine this 
plan' s actual implications and possible consequences. Lastly, we raise an alternative perspective for 
desirable reforms of housing finance policy.
  Background: Financial deregulation and bad loan problems
The logic behind the recent changes in housing policies was given, in １９９５, by the report of the 
Council for Housing and Residential Land, an advisory commission for the Minister of Construction. 
This report entitled Principles of Housing and Residential Land Policy in the Twenty-first Century, 
raised the new idea that an aim of housing policy is to establish the prerequisites for smooth 
functioning of housing markets. Arguably, the restructuring of housing finance policy may be 
regarded as a part of the necessary steps to achieve this target. Nevertheless, to reveal its actual 
meaning, we have to begin by considering the macro-economic context in light of the structural 
changes in financial markets. The background of the changes in housing finance policy can be 
summarized in the following two issues: financial deregulation and bad loan problems.
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１ For a detailed consideration on the recent changes in housing policies, see Oizumi, ２００２, pp.１８２-１８３., and 
Oizumi, ２００４, pp. ６８-７０.
Japanese 'Big-Bang' Policy as a financial deregulation  
In November １９９６, the ' Banking and Securities Market Big-Bang'  was announced by the then Prime 
Minister Hashimoto. It indicated the government policy to carry out comprehensive reform and 
deregulation of Japan' s financial system during the period from １９９９ to ２００１. The contents of this 
policy were diverse, including the deregulation of foreign exchange dealings, securities dealings and 
selling of hybrid financial products, the elimination of restrictions on the competition among banking, 
securities and insurance businesses, and the establishment of financial holding companies, as a means 
to promote the capital concentration across the various sections of financial business.
The ' Big-Bang'  policy, in the long run, was intended to complete at a stroke the financial 
deregulation started from the １９７０s. The central concern of the financial deregulation, in fact, lies in 
large commercial bankscity banks'  interests. To clarify this point on financial deregulation, we first 
need to examine the historical context of Japan' s industrial-financial  relations . 

During the high-growth years from the １９５０s to the early １９７０s, the most significant customers of 
banking institutions were large industrial enterprises that borrowed from banks to finance vigorous 
investments. However, from the mid-１９７０s the relation between large enterprises and banking 
institutions started to change. In the lower-growth years that continued into the １９８０s, the level of 
money capital accumulation in the industrial sector increased remarkably, thanks to high retained 
earnings and fund surplus. Conditions were such that large industrial enterprises needed to invest less 
in production capacities even while their money assets accumulated. Large enterprises, therefore, 
shifted away from bank-financing to self-financing, and large banks consequently faced a declining 
role in corporate financing. It was in this environment of lower-growth and increasing money capital 
accumulation that financial deregulation was initiated. 
Deregulation began with the bonds market. In １９７５, the government began to issue larger volumes 
of government bonds to cover its growing budget deficit. Faced with the drastic rise in government 
bond issues, the Ministry of Finance, in １９７７, relaxed restrictions on the secondary market for bonds. 
The next step was the liberalization of interest-rates. With the creation of CDnegotiable certificates 
of depositmarket in １９７９, the government gradually liberalized interest-rates. In １９９４, when the 
Ministry of Finance liberalized completely deposit interest-rates, the entire system of interest-rate 
regulation, which had supported Japan' s financial system during the postwar period, came to an end.
The changes in corporate finance and financial deregulation put large banks in a double bind. On 
the one hand, by losing major customers  because large industrial enterprises were also major 




２ Matsumoto, ２００２, pp.１３０-１３２, presents a good analysis about the changes in corporate finance and their impact 
on banking institutions.
to expand the network of their branches in order to collect as many deposits as possible, often through 
the merger and acquisition of banks. On the other, they were forced not just to expand lending but 
also to seek new business in money markets. Losing low-risk borrowers  because large industrial 
enterprises were already finding alternative sources of funding  , these banks competitively relaxed 
their loan requirements in order to expand their loan portfolios. Financial deregulation furthered such 
banking policy at the same time. Consequently, banks'  lending was diverted into risky investors in 
stock and real estate markets. In contrast, housing loans were appreciated with lower-risk and proved 
more profitable business for banks, so private housing loans began to rapidly grow from the １９７０s, as 
will be mentioned later.
This strategy reached a problematic climax in the ' bubble economy'  years from １９８５ to １９９１. 
After the G５ '  Plaza Accord in １９８５, when the Bank of Japan began to reduce its basic money rate 
and increase money-supply to banks, ' bubble economy'  prevailed. Banking institutions entered into a 
fierce competition in the lending market. Banks concentrated their lending almost exclusively on 
borrowers investing in stock and real estate markets. Supported by an extraordinary rise in stock and 
land prices, speculative property financing escalated, and after all, collapsed.
Thus we can conclude that financial deregulation was precipitated by the lower economic growth 
and the changes in corporate finance, and that it promoted competition among banks in the money 
market. Although this deregulation process furthered the capital concentration in large banks, the 
banks were damaged heavily through the collapse of bubble economy. What the ' Big-Bang'  policy 
intended, therefore, was to resume strengthening the financial dominance of large banks. 
The ' Big-Bang'  policy, in the short run, was intended to activate securities markets. The lasting 
depression in stock markets, along with banks'  bad loan problems, caused the instability of Japan' s 
entire financial system. Seemingly, the government expected that financial deregulation would 
stimulate the shift of individuals'  financial assets away from deposits and savings to securities. The 
time it was conceived, households'  financial assets were estimated at １２００ trillion yen１０ trillion US 
dollars as of １９９７, ５５.１ percent of which were composed of deposits and savings. The expected 
increase in such flow of funds into securities markets would bring about the recovery of stock 
markets, and Tokyo financial markets would ' come back'  as one of the world money centers, where 
large banks could play a leading role. The ' Big-Bang'  policy thus mainly targeted the deregulation in 
securities  markets .

However, the result was contrary to what the government expected. The ' Big-Bang'  policy, along 
with the failure of the policy to urge banks to dispose of bad loans, led the financial system to a 
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３ JSRI, ２０００, provides a comprehensive explanation of the deregulation in Japanese securities markets.
serious crisis. Next we consider another issue: bad loan problems in banks.
Bad loan problem as a crisis of banking system
Recent Japanese recession is, in a sense, a financial crisis, because the recession intertwines with the 
bankruptcy of many financial institutions and the credit crunch resulting from the pressure of bad 
loans piled up in banks. During the bubble economy years, most sectors of the Japanese economy 
enjoyed an enormous amount of capital gains and its ' wealth effects'  caused an increase in 
consumption and investment. Since the early １９９０s, however, the situation has changed dramatically 
for the worse. Caused by a fall in the prices of stocks and real estate, an enormous amount of capital 
loss appeared. It was estimated that a burst of the bubble in both share prices and land prices 
destroyed １０００ trillion yen in assets value. The ' reverse wealth effects'  causing a decrease in 
consumption and investment created a downward over-shooting in business cycles.
Banks were in special troubles, because of the BIS guideline that banks should observe the ８ 
percent capital adequacy-rate. With the vanishing of their latent capital gains, banks had trouble 
maintaining this ratio and hence had to restrict severely their loans. Many medium- and small-firms, 
which depended on bank loans to finance their business, were forced to reduce their activities, or 
failed. As the credit crunch spread these difficulties into a widening range of businesses, firm 
bankruptcy and unemployment rates increased remarkably.
The burst bubble and the difficulties of both financial institutions and industrial sectors thus ensued 
a vicious circle. The problem is complicated by the fact that given the credit crunch, medium- and 
small firms cannot finance their business without bank loans. In this destructive deflationary spiral, 
bad loans cannot easily be reduced. Rather they have increased, reaching １０３ trillion yen９５５ billion 
in US dollars, or ２２ percent of banks'  total loans, as of March  ２０００ .

Chiefly to mitigate the hardship in banks and stock market, the Bank of Japan gradually reduced its 
basic money rate to ０.５ percent in September １９９５, and afterwards led the interest-rate of call money 
in the inter-bank market to zero percent in substance, from March １９９９ onward, through 
continuously supplying money. This easing of monetary policy has worked as a rescue for banks and 
other financial institutions. Moreover, the emergency rescue operations for them were absorbing huge 
amounts of public funds. In １９９８ and １９９９, ３０ and ７０ trillion yen２５０ and ５８３ billion US dollars 




４ For this estimation, see Matsumoto, ２００１, pp.１５３-１５５. Note that this amount represents the total bad loans in all 
bankscity banks, regional banks, trust banks, and long-term credit banks. There is also a large amount of bad loans 
in other financial institutions composed of credit unions, credit cooperatives, public financial institutions, and ' non-
banks'leasing companies, and, consumer and business finance companies.
due to cumulative bad  loans . 

These rescue operations were accompanied by the double pressures towards merger among large 
financial institutions and elimination among weakened small-sized financial institutions. The 
government policy urging banks to dispose of bad loans, in fact, revolved around the double standards 
of ' too big to fail'  and ' too small to be rescued' .
The results of both the ' Big-Bang'  policy and the unsolved bad loan problem, thus, can be 
summarized as follows:
A drastic merger wave in financial institutions created the four major banks: Mitsubishi-Tokyo, 
Mizuho, Mitsui-Sumitomo and UFJ. Besides, UFJ is going to merge into Mitsubishi-Tokyo Bank. 
Despite the overwhelming concentration of money capital in these mega-banks, they have serious 
weaknesses: the underdeveloped skills in financial assets management, and the consolidated bad 
loan problems. Japanese major banks are, therefore, faced with the double necessity of making 
forays into securities markets, and developing profitable money lending markets. 
A severe elimination wave is spreading among regional banking institutions. They have faced 
double hardships, the bad loan problems and the intensifying competition against larger banks for 
lending markets. In the eleven years from １９９０ to ２０００, more than ２００ regional banking 
institutions failed. In just a single year ２０００, one regional bank, ９ credit unions and ３７ credit 
cooperatives  failed .

' Big-Bang'  deregulation was, as it were, a bet on securities markets at the expense of the 
established system of intermediation. However it made borrowing-lending relationship more 
confused, involving also regional banking institutions. Cumulative bad loans escalated this 
confusion into a financial crisis.
The above considerations lead us to direct our attention to the shifting interest of banking 
institutions into the housing finance market. Growing housing finance is an important arena wherein 
major banks could develop their lending and securitization business. In the following sections, we 
address issues in the restructuring of housing finance policy and then the situation of housing finance 
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５ Itoh, ２００２, provides a comprehensive review of Japanese financial system, housing finance market and their 
instability from a macro-economic perspective.
６ Generally, the scale of Japan' s regional banking institutions is much larger than that of Western European 
savings institutions and the US thrift institutions. Therefore, the impact that their failure makes on the Japanese 
regional economies is very serious. The average sum of deposits of a credit union amounts to more than ２００ billion 
yen１.５ billion in US dollar, and that of a credit cooperative amounts to more than ６０ billion yen４６０ million in 
US dollar. Besides, the scale of regional banks is much larger than that of credit unions and cooperatives.
market. 
  Restructuring of housing finance policy
In April ２００１, the new Cabinet led by Prime Minister Koizumi started, with a slogan that the 
deregulation of the economy and the downsizing of the public sector have to be thoroughly executed. 
As part of this resolve, the government declared the privatization of both postal services and special 
administrative corporations including GHLC. This policy means a drastic restructuring of the public 
credit system that has supported the Japanese economy since the postwar period.
Japan' s public credit system is operated by the Treasury Investment and Loan Program, called the 
' Zaito'  system for short. The ' Zaito'  system, starting from １９５３, was designed to finance government 
policy measures, such as the construction of social infrastructure including housing and the 
development of medium- and small-firms, with households'  funds drawn from postal savings, 
employees pension and national pension funds channeled through special accounts, government-
affiliated financial institutions and public corporations. GHLC is one of such financial institutions, 
moreover, the one taking the largest amount of funds from the １９７０s onward.
Government's plan to abolish GHLC
In December ２００１, the government adopted the reform program of special administrative 
corporations. According to this program, GHLC will be abolished within five years, and replaced by 
an independent administrative corporation, which models itself on the agency system in Britain, 
dealing exclusively in securitization business of bank housing loans. GHLC will begin to curtail 
gradually its housing loan service from the year ２００２, while the government will not provide GHLC 
with interest-subsidy, in principle.
Why should GHLC be abolished? The rationale behind the government decision can be interpreted 
as follows:
GHLC had worked as the major tool of the policy to promote housing provision; as a result, 
housing and housing finance markets have fully grown. GHLC has already ended its role, and 
turned to rather an obstacle against the growth of private housing finance. GHLC, with the total 
sum of housing loans amounting to ７４.５ trillion yen５７３ billion in US dollarsas of March ２０００, 
is the largest among the specialized housing financial institutions in the world. Its share of Japan' s 
housing finance market reaches ４４ percent as of March １９９９.
Banking business circles strongly claim that GHLC is crowding out their expansion of housing 




The resources of GHLC loans are, available via the ' Zaito'  system, postal savings and welfare 
pension funds. When the interest-rate for GHLC borrowing from these funds becomes higher than 
that for GHLC housing loans, the interest gap is replenished by government subsidy. This is the 
measure to keep the interest-rate for GHLC loans low and constant. However, banking circles 
claim it is unfair practice that GHLC exclusively enjoys government subsidy. 
The aim of housing finance policy should be to establish the prerequisites whereby the housing 
finance market can work smoothly and appropriately. The abolition of GHLC would create the 
wide room wherein private housing loan can grow all the more. The disposal of GHLC loans 
through sale would offer private financial institutions an opportunity to obtain lower-risk and 
profitable financial assets. A new administrative corporation exclusively dealing with securitization 
business would lead to the growing secondary market of housing loans, as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in the USA once did.
That' s all about main grounds of the government' s plan. Next we examine them.
Examining Government's plan to abolish GHLC
To clarify the actual implication of this policy restructuring, we consider the development of GHLC 
and housing finance market in a historical context. 
Originally, GHLC was established to provide public funds for the construction of both owner-
occupied and rented housing. The Act of GHLC stipulated that the aim of GHLC was to promote the 
construction of private housing, through long-term lending with low interest to households buying 
homes and corporations constructing rented houses. GHLC standard terms of lending were prescribed 
as follows: The term of payment was to be less than １５, ２０ or ３０ years１９５０-１９７７, and less than 
２５ or ３５ years１９７８-the present, and the basic interest-rate was to be fixed and less than ５.５ percent 
per yearthe rate was sometimes changed, within this limit, in accordance with the changes in the 
interest-rate of ' Zaito'   fund .

However, despite acute needs for housing construction, the amount of funds distributed through 
GHLC remained very limited, with the bulk of public and private funds distributed to industrial 
investments. The number of housing construction funded by GHLC was ３１０ thousands units in the 
years from １９５０ to １９５５, while that of private housing construction without any public assistance was 
１.１１ million units in the same period.
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７ The interest-rate of ５.５% was the cheapest, equal to that of government bonds, among long-term interest-rates at 
that time. Historical considerations on GHLC'  operations are given in Honma, １９８７, pp.１７４-１８９, １９１-１９６; and 
Harada, ２０００, pp.３６-３７.
To fund as much housing construction as possible within the limited resources, GHLC strongly 
tended to loan to constructing owner-occupied houses for the middle or upper-middle classes, and 
hence loans to rented house construction remained less than １０ percent of the total sum. In short, 
despite the similarity in appearance to the German social housing system, which mainly funded 
rented housing construction, the actual function of GHLC was the exclusive promotion of 
homeownership.
As the consecutive ５ year programs of housing construction started from １９６６, the public policy 
to promote housing construction intensified. GHLC was placed in the center of the policy favouring 
home ownership. GHLC began to expand its housing loans from the １９７０s on. Annual GHLC loan 
increased from just over a trillion yen in １９７３ to ３ trillion yen in １９７９, and further to ５.５ trillion３４ 
billion in US dollarsin １９９０. This remarkable increase has been supported by the government' s 
business-cycle policy. When the economic recession during the years from １９７０ to １９７１ appeared, 
the government increased the ' Zaito'  funds to be distributed to GHLC in order to stimulate the 
economy. Supported by this measure, GHLC could expand its housing loans. Since then, the 
government has used GHLC loans as a part of Keynesian fiscal  policy . From the government' s 

perspective, the expansion of GHLC loans was an effective and relatively inexpensive policy tool, 
because it immediately led to the expansion of housing construction with strong ripple effects to 
industries concerned.
It was noteworthy that, despite the rapid growth of GHLC loans, housing loans by private financial 
institutions grew faster than that by GHLC from the １９７０s on. Housing finance became an important, 
relatively safe, and profitable business field for banking institutions after the high-growth period 
ended. Private housing loan reached ５.５ trillion yen in １９８０ and increased to a peak in １９９０ of over 
２１ trillion１３１ billion in US dollars.
However, the rapid growth of both public and private housing loans was accompanied by the 
problem that, due to skyrocketing land and housing prices, homeownership was getting more difficult 
without larger amounts of borrowing. From the perspective of the government'  economic policy, the 
growth of housing loans led to the boosting of housing construction and economic growth, while, 
from the perspective of urban residents, this led to the increasing affordability problem in 
homeownership.
Nevertheless, to present a balanced view, we need to pay attention to another function of GHLC 
loans. GHLC has played an important role in directing the improvement of dwellings'  quality. The 




８ For a detailed consideration of this issue, see GHLC, １９８０, pp.１３４-１３８.
the Code of Building. For instance, there are regulations on the structure, requirements and size of 
detached houses, and the common facilities of apartment houses in the building standards of GHLC 
loans, while none of such regulations exists in the Code of Building. These regulations make 
dwellings funded by GHLC better quality than dwellings regulated only by the Code of Building. 
However, regrettably, the building standards of GHLC loans are not linked with the regulations in the 
City Planning Act. So far, they cannot contribute to the improvement of urban space  itself .        

Thus we can tentatively conclude as follows: 
GHLC has provided the working class people with easier access to home  purchases , and led the 

growth of housing finance market wherein private banking institutions could expand housing loans. 
The characteristic of GHLC loan is long term lending with fixed and low interest-rate. Is this merit 
really replaceable by private financial institutions?
GHLC has concentrated its lending on owner-occupied housing. Combined with the lack of 
advocacy for policy neutrality on housing tenures, this concentration led to the serious 
backwardness in the provision of affordable rented houses. To resolve this problem, housing 
finance should support to provide not just owner-occupied houses but also rented houses. Is this 
dual working really replaceable by private financial institutions? 
GHLC has contributed, through the building standards applied to its lending, to the improvement 
of dwelling'  quality. This important role of housing finance should be kept and developed. Is this 
role really replaceable by private financial institutions?
Regrettably, the government decision has never given convincing answers to the above questions, 
because the priority was apparently given major banks'  interests in increasing their share of housing 
finance market, without regard to the merits and demerits of GHLC operation.
  Possible consequences of abolishing GHLC
The above questions about the government new policy have to be supplemented with the 
consideration on the possible consequences of abolishing GHLC. These implications are likely to be 
greatly conditioned by the present trends of housing market and housing finance market.  
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９ For a detailed comparison of GHLC'  building standards and the Code of Building, see Honma, １９８７, pp.２５６-２６０.
１０ According to a recent GHLC report, among the recipients of GHLC loans, ８１.９ percent are composed of 
households with less than ８ million yen of yearly income, roughly equal to the average annual income of all 
working households, while the share of those households among recipients of private housing loans is ５０.９ percent.
Maturation and increasing instability of housing market
In Western European context, housing markets in most countries experienced a rapid growth, the 
' mass housing'  stage, in the １９５０s and the １９６０s, and then entered the ' maturation'  stage from the 
１９７０s. The most remarkable features of this maturation stage are as follows: First, the greater role of 
the private sector in the production, allocation and financing of housing; secondly, the growing share 
of homeownership in the market; thirdly, the lower growth of housing construction and more 
dominant dealings of existing houses in the market, resulting from the filled up housing shortage; 
lastly, the increasing fragmentation or differentiation of housing  markets . 

Japan' s housing market also entered the same stage, yet, with a poor quality of housing stock. This 
led to serious problems for the housing market and the policy to promote housing construction.
Although absolute housing shortage was filled up in the early １９７０s when the number of housing 
stock exceeded that of households in each part of the country, housing construction, which was 
accompanied by vigorous dismantling of existing houses, has remarkably increased since then. 
Thanks to this ' scrapping and building'  manner, the housing market and its related businesses 
enjoyed a very rapid growth. As a result, Japan' s housing market is presently huge. Roughly 
estimated, the total price of newly built dwelling units, in １９９０ when the property boom reached its 
peak, amounted to ７６.８ trillion yen４８０ billion US dollars, about １８ percent of GDP. The housing 
market is, therefore, somewhat larger in sales terms than automobile market in the country. The 
housing market has an important role in the domestic market, despite the fact its size reflects also the 
high level of land  prices .

However, due to the lasting depression from the １９９０s onward, housing provision faces a dilemma: 
the increasing instability in housing market. Generally, under the condition where the housing 
provision through markets is dominant, it is difficult to maintain and improve dwelling conditions for 
urban residents without stable growth in their ability to pay for rents or house purchases. 
Nevertheless, this requirement is in jeopardy at present. The depression and the drastic restructuring 
of industries have caused an increase in unemployment and a decrease in the disposal income of 
working people. Broader economic and labor market changes are resulting in an increasing 
polarization of incomes and living conditions, not just for the poor but for the middle mass as well. 
Both the housing market and the policy to promote housing provision face the aggravating problem 
that effective demand for houses continues to decline.




１１ Detailed considerations on these remarkable changes in housing markets and policies in Western European 
countries are given in Ball and Harloe, １９９４ and １９９８; Hallett, １９９３; and Kleinman, １９９８.
１２ For this estimation, see Itoh, ２００２, p.１６１.
these problems in the postwar period meant the variety of difficulty in obtaining a house including 
excessive financial burdens, poor accommodations on small plots and long hours commuting on jam-
packed trains, due exclusively to the rise in land and housing prices. An affordability crisis in the 
bubble economy led these difficulties to a climax. Yet, despite all these difficulties, urban residents 
could expect homeownership in future, because their dreams had some basis in reality as long as their 
incomes were steadily increasing. However, the situation has changed completely. The housing 
market is afflicted by problems of negative equity, bad loan and repossession. Both first-time and 
second-time buyers suffer severe blows from declines in both income and housing prices. They face 
the acute risk and instability of the market.
Faced with such extreme problems, market-oriented housing policy provides only one solution, 
that is, stimulating house construction through deregulation and privatization. However this supply-
side policy will result in more serious problems for urban  residents .

The focus of deregulation and privatization policy, in practice, is exclusively on the redevelopment 
problems of large cities such as Tokyo and Osaka. This policy aims at the disposal of sites and 
properties as mortgage for huge bad debts, with the target of promoting ' intensive land-use'  in city 
centers. This growth-oriented approach to urban development has never been changed since its 
adoption in the postwar period. But things have changed, in particular the assumption that eliminating 
barriers to growth will remove the binding constraint on further urban development. Increased 
selectivity in property investment has become crucial at present, since Japan is no longer in a milieu 
wherein any investment in land can make an easy gain. Profitability is, therefore, an increasingly 
important criterion in property investment.
This criterion, though crucial for now-cautious developers, has huge implications for the character 
of housing development itself. Under profit-oriented marketization, housing provision becomes 
increasingly differential. Housing provision by the public sector is becoming more and more residual; 
Private rented housing is provided in a discriminatory and profit-seeking manner; Homeownership 
increasingly differentiates households on the basis of wealth. These changes mean that an even larger 
share of housing needs goes unmet.
  These historical changes and problems in Japan' s housing market reflect on the housing finance 
market. Next we turn our examination to this point.
Increasing instability of housing finance market
The housing finance market enjoyed a rapid growth during the １９７０s and the １９８０s. In this process, 
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１３ For a detailed consideration of this issue, see Oizumi, １９９４, １９９８, ２００２, ２００４. An analysis of urban planning 
deregulation, linked with the policy to activate property markets, is also provided by, Oizumi, ２００３, pp.１８０-１８２.
major city banks continued to expand their housing loans, while they began to set up a circuitous 
funding channel so as to avoid risks entailed housing loans. This channel was the private housing 
finance company, called ' Jusen'  in short. In the late １９７０s, eight ' Jusen'  companies were set up by 
city banks and other financial institutions. Although these companies were designed for channeling 
banks'  funds into housing market and introducing a new scheme for the mobilization of housing 
loans such as trusteeing mortgage debts, they moved into high-risk lending to commercial real estate 
business since the bubble economy appeared from the mid-１９８０s, and finally failed. It was because 
their mother banks began to expand rapidly housing loan, and consequently took away the market for 
' Jusen'  companies. The first large-scale attempt to introduce new business into housing finance 
market, thus, ended in failure.
Due to the collapse of the bubble economy and the following depression, banks'  housing loans 
showed lower-growth. However, supported by the government policy to stimulate the economy, 
GHLC loans continued to expand. This contrast in performance gave banking business circles the 
ground for claiming that GHLC restrained them to expand their housing loans.
Besides, easy monetary policy and lower interest-rates caused a problem for GHLC. Since GHLC 
loans are callable, the borrowers from GHLC with previous relatively high interest-rates rushed to 
change their debts to private banking institutions. GHLC is suffering quite a loss from this increasing 
prepayment risk. Although new lending continues to expand, an increasing part of the ' Zaito'  fund 
distributed to GHLC remains disused, because of increasing prepayment by borrowers. Furthermore, 
the government interest-subsidy for GHLC is swelling. This situation provides also room for claims 
that GHLC operation is very inefficient.
From the perspective of the neo-liberalist government and banking circles, surely this is a good 
opportunity for abolishing GHLC and resuming the attempt to restructure housing finance market. 
However, such a policy cannot produce satisfactory results for housing provision and urban residents.
Money market has provided an extraordinarily easy financing since the late １９９０s. Under such 
conditions, banking institutions have been allocating their increased lending not to the medium- and 
small-firms, but to housing loans. As a result, the interest-rates on housing loans have been 
remarkably reduced: the interest-rateadjustableof major commercial banks is ２.３７５ percent per 
year as of April ２００２, while the basic interest-rate on GHLC loan is ２.７５ percent per year. Such lower 
interest-rates certainly mitigate borrowers'  burden to pay. Yet, the interest-rate on housing loans is 
usually reduced later and less than other interest-rates: for instance, the interest-rates on time 
deposits, postal savings and trust deposits range between ０.０２ percent and ０.０７ percent. 
Furthermore, many households with housing debt have difficulties in meeting their return 




decrease in the prices of land and existing houses, these conditions lead to negative equity problems 
and increasing bankruptcy among borrowers. Thus, despite the reduced prices of new built dwellings 
and the easy access to low-cost housing loans, the housing market and its related businesses are 
experiencing a depression. This is an important part of deflationary pressures on the Japanese 
economy over the recent years.
So far as the lasting depression cannot easily reach a bottom or turning point, the extraordinary 
lower interest-rates must continue still. But this condition cannot be permanent anyway. Once 
monetary policies are tightened, private housing loans will be selectively or discriminatively provided 
and interest-rates will increase. This risk is easily transferable onto borrowers, because banking 
institutions have preferably introduced adjustable interests on housing loans. Besides, most 
households are vulnerable to such acute risk. The changes in housing finance market, therefore, will 
lead easily to the increasing affordability crisis.
Since there are so many poor dwellings to be replaced in urban areas, housing finance and housing 
construction shall have the opportunity to expand again. However, it will result in the increasing 
polarization of housing provision, unless the present policy is changed fundamentally.
  Thus we have to conclude that the abolition of GHLC will cause new problems in the housing 
finance market.
It is questionable that private banking institutions can substitute completely for GHLC'  role to 
provide constantly working people with easy access to homeownership. Under financial 
deregulation, banks'  lending strategies are increasingly volatile. The housing finance market is 
likely to suffer more and more from the changing influences of financial markets. The 
securitization business on housing loans cannot cover completely such financial risks, and it is in 
the distant future anyhow that the secondary market for housing loans is likely to fully grow. 
Besides, the development of the secondary market would cause some new problems for local 
housing finance markets, as the US experience  demonstrates .

It is very questionable that private banking institutions, unlike GHLC concentrating its funds on 
homeownership, can distribute their lending not just to owner-occupied housing but also to rented 
housing. It is very desirable that both affordable owner-occupied and affordable rented housing are 
promoted. However, needless to say that, banks'  primary concern is to seek profitability in 
financing, so it is difficult to expect them to meet all the needs of housing provision.
It is still more questionable that private banking institutions will outright accept the public 
regulation on building standards to be applied to their lending. In fact, their lending has been 
frequently extended even to houses clearly breaking the Code of Building. Despite the necessity of 
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expanding this kind of financial regulation to urban development, any role for housing finance in 
improving the quality of dwellings and their environments for all residents will remain limited, 
because of ongoing deregulation.
These questions lead us to the consideration on the reforms of policy and market. Despite our 
objection against the abolition of GHLC, it is also clear that GHLC bears some faults that need to be 
reformed. Despite the questions raised about market operations, it is nonsense to deny the 
significance of private banking sector. To resolve housing problems, it is necessary to control both 
GHLC and private banking institutions appropriately through a constructive reform of the regulation 
system.
  An alternative perspective: for desirable revision of housing finance policy
The reform agenda of the housing finance policy should not be considered in isolation. Any simple 
idea will not be fruitful, unless it is accompanied with the comprehensive reform of the entire housing 
policies. Hence we need to consider the vision inherent in the reforms that cover both housing market 
and housing finance market.
Reform of housing policy and market
A new perspective on housing policy is needed as an alternative to those put forward by the neo-
liberalism asserting deregulation and privatization. This new approach focuses on the development of 
both public policies and residents'  initiatives that can manage land and housing markets appropriately 




１４ Dymski and Isenberg, １９９７, examine the US housing finance market after deregulation, and bring the following 
problems to lightpp.１８７-１９５: First, the integration of housing finance into the entire financial markets, through the 
growth of the secondary mortgage market, would destabilize the housing finance market. In particular, an increase in 
interest-rates frequently creates a ' lock-in'  effect against housing loans. Secondly, because of deregulation, money-
flows in housing mortgages increased market volatility. Thirdly, the standardization of housing mortgage, which is 
the requisite for issuing mortgage-backed securities in the secondary market, furthered the ' redlining' , or the 
discrimination in mortgage lending. Fourthly, adjustable mortgage interest-rates were introduced to make the risk of 
changing interest-rates transferable to borrowers. Lastly, in stagnated local areas where ' spill-over'  effects of the 
increasing assets value could not be anticipated, an entire local credit market declined. It led to the withdrawal of 
financial institutions from those areas. Overall, Dymski and Isenberg noted that US housing finance did not become 
less pro-cyclical because of the widespread adoption of securitization in the １９８０s. Besides, they noted that the 
wider channel for ' standard'  loans on ' standard'  houses threatened to reduce the availability of financing means for 
non-standard housing loans. In this case, the term ' non-standard'  means the type of neighbourhood, the 
income/wealth characteristics of the borrower, and so on.  

Public regulation over both the ownership and use of land should be strengthened to eliminate 
land speculation and secure sufficient housing sites in urban areas. 
A significant increase in the supply of public housing is required, particularly in large cities. 
A comprehensive system of rent subsidies and financial assistance should be developed to 
promote affordable housing in both private rented markets and owner-occupied markets. 
The improvement of poor-quality housing stock should be promoted through the collaboration 
of municipal authorities, developers, and residents. 
These orientations should be linked to the development of economic policy that promotes 
regional industries and increased employment.
To clarify the implications of these proposals, we need to discuss some additional points, which are 
concerned with the relationship between local and national considerations in urban and housing 
development, and the residents'  initiative in the above-mentioned collaboration among interested 
parties. 
First, if we are to resolve serious urban and housing problems, clearly some forms of economic and 
social planning are required. It is necessary to assess housing needs and to link housing requirements 
into wider economic and social priorities, and into constraints for sustainable urban development. 
Effective and reasonable planning at the national level is required in this context. Ongoing growth-
oriented urban policy has to be completely changed, because this policy is forcing cities to compete 
with each other for the economic growth, and is consequently leading to the decline of local cities.
Secondly, it is also necessary to establish the local programs of house building, repair and 
improvement or redevelopment. These programs are to be made through the collaboration of 
municipal authorities, developers and residents, based on assessments of local housing needs and 
available resources in terms of local and national criteria. What is very important is to take account of 
all housing tenures.
Thirdly, residents'  participation in determining the programs should be given the most precedence. 
Residents should have an effective voice in the development of housing programs and in detailed 
matters such as house design. Effective participation can only be achieved locally rather than at the 
national level. It is very important that residents in distinct localities can choose, through the process 
of political representation and within nationally laid-down minima, different levels of outputs, mixes 
of tenure, house types and standards.
Lastly, it is needed to develop institutional forms that support these programs nationally and locally 
to work smoothly and appropriately. The reformed housing finance system should be an 
indispensable part of them. 
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Reform of housing finance policy and market
The main implication of desirable housing finance reform would be to redirect the various money-
flows in owner-occupation and rented-occupation, towards the effective use of economic resources to 
provide decent and affordable housing for all residents. Our proposals focus on constructing a 
financial infrastructure to secure the appropriate intermediating operations of public and private 
financial institutions.
Rebuilding GHLC activities and maximizing its accountability
One of the main features of GHLC loans is that a growing part has been directed exclusively to 
homeownership and subordinated to the government' s business cycle policy. These defects have led 
to the corpulence of GHLC loans and, often, the excessive loans producing many bankrupts. 
Instead, it is our belief that GHLC operation has to be subordinated to the housing system designed 
above. GHLC is suitable for funding the housing provision programs operated at the national level. 
The building standards applied to GHLC loans should be improved and closely linked with the 
regulations in urban planning. Under this reform, GHLC should keep playing the sound role of 
anchor in housing finance market, through lending with fixed and lower interest-rate. So far as this 
basic function is maintained, it is acceptable that GHLC provides a variety of housing finance 
services including securitization business and housing loan insurance. 
What is very important is to maximize the accountability of GHLC management through the 
democratic control by the Parliament. So far, the management of ' Zaito'  system including GHLC has 
been controlled exclusively by the government bureaucracy. The development of fiscal democracy 
will lead to making GHLC operate appropriately, in the overall public interest.
Establishing the 'Japanese CRACommunity Reinvestment Act' or the 'Financial 
Assessment Act' to regulate private banking institutions
While city banks are the largest players in private housing finance, their lending strategies will show 
increasing volatility and strongly tend to engage in upmarket retail banking. In the context of the new 
housing system, regional banking institutions can play an important role in local housing markets. 
However, they presently face the severe elimination wave, with the credit crunch causing crises in 
regional industries.
It is noteworthy that, to overcome these difficulties, some councils organized locally and nationally 
by entrepreneurs of medium and small-firms are working towards the establishment of the ' Japanese 
CRA' , modeled on the Community Reinvestment Act in the USA, or the ' Financial Assessment Act' . 




disadvantageous to medium and small-firms, and to further banks'  function to channel money-flows 
into the sectors where investment is needed for the stable growth of local economies and 
communities. To establish a fair regional financial market, which is a prerequisite for the growth of 
regional industries, the Act prescribes the system monitoring the business of regional banking 
institutions and publishing this monitoring information useful in the assessing of banks'  activities. 
This information has to be used effectively by the financial policymakers to regulate or assist regional 
banking  institutions . 

Apparently, this system has to be expanded to housing finance business in order to promote a fair 
local housing finance market. Furthermore, the public regulation on the building standards is to be 
imposed also to private housing loans. These building standards can be flexible in accordance with 
the varying needs of good urban planning in distinct localities. This regulatory and inductive system 
will certainly aid in appropriately directing, in the public interest, the large private funds to the 
already proposed housing programs improving residents'  homes and urban space.
References
Ball, Michael, and Michael Harloe. １９９４. "Housing and the Market: Recent Changes in Europe 
and the USA." Housing and Social Changes in Europe and the USA, ed. Michael Ball, et al. １-３５. 
Kyoto: Koyo Shobo.in Japanese
 １９９８. "Uncertainty in European Housing Markets." European Integration and Housing 
Policy, ed. Mark Kleinman, et al. ５９-７６. London and New York: Routledge.
Dymski, Gary, and Dorene Isenberg. １９９７. "Social Efficiency and the Market Revolution in US 
Housing Finance." Welfare State System in Japan and the United States, ed. Sinya Imura, et al. １７１-
２０６. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron-sha.in Japanese
Government Housing Loan CorporationGHLC. １９８０. Thirty Years of Government Housing Loan 
Corporation, Tokyo: GHLC.in Japanese
Hallett, Graham. ed. １９９３. The New Housing Shortage: Housing affordability in Europe and the 
USA, Routledge: London and New York.
Harada, Sumitaka. ２０００. "Housing Law and Policy in postwar and present Japan: From a View 
Point of the Comparison with Britain, Germany and France." Discussion Paper Series, J-９５. Institute 
of Research on Social Sciences in Tokyo University. １-５９.in Japanese
Honma, Yoshihito. １９８７. Housing in postwar Japan: A History, Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron-sha.
in Japanese
－70－
Financial Deregulation and the Privatization of Housing Finance Policy in Japan
１５ For a detailed explanation about the proposal of Financial Assessment Act, see Yamaguchi, ２０００.
Itoh, Makoto. ２００２. "Housing Finance in Japanese Financial Instability." Seeking Shelter on the 
Pacific Rim: Financial Globalization, Social Change, and the Housing Market, ed. Gary Dymski and 
Dorene Isenberg, １５０-１６８. New York: M.E.Sharpe.
Japan Securities Research InstituteJSRI. ２０００. Securities Market in Japan ２００１. Tokyo: JSRI.
Kleinman, Mark. １９９８. "Western European Housing Policies: Convergence or Collapse?" 
European Integration and Housing Policy ed. Mark Kleinman, et al. ２４２-２５５. London and New York: 
Routledge.
Matsumoto, Akira. ２００１. "Bubble and Bad Loan Problem." Keizai, Journal of Political Economy, 
７５: １４３-１５８.in Japanese
 ２００２. "The Japanese Bubble: Domestic and International Aspects." Seeking Shelter on the 
Pacific Rim: Financial Globalization, Social Change, and the Housing Market, ed. Gary Dymski and 
Dorene Isenberg, １２７-１４９. New York: M.E.Sharpe.
Oizumi, Eiji. １９９４. "Property Finance in Japan: Expansion and Collapse on the Bubble Economy." 
Environment and Planning A, ２６２: １９９-２１３. 
 １９９８. "Government Policy of Rebuilding Financial System and Urban Land Problem." 
Keizai, Journal of Political Economy, ３８: ２４-３６.in Japanese
 ２０００. "Fundamental Issues of Housing Policies in the Present Age" Housing Problems and 
Housing Policy: A Comparative Perspective on the US and Japan, ed. Eiji Oizumi, et al. ２４５-２６４. 
Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron-sha.in Japanese
 ２００１. "Housing Policy and the Maturation in Housing Market: A Historical and Comparative 
Perspective on Recent Changes in Japan' s Housing Policies." Ryukoku University Business Review, ４１
２: １４-２３.in Japanese
 ２００２. "Housing Provision and Marketization in １９８０s and １９９０s Japan: A New Stage of the 
Affordability Problem?" Seeking Shelter on the Pacific Rim: Financial Globalization, Social Change, 
and the Housing Market, ed. Gary Dymski and Dorene Isenberg, １６９-１８６. New York: M.E.Sharpe.
 ２００３. "Changing urban and residential space in Japan" Socio-economics on Space, ed. Eiji 
Oizumi, et al., １６２-１８８. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoron-sha.in Japanese
 ２００４. "Regional Regeneration and the Agendas of Japan' s Housing Policy" Keizai, Journal of 
Political Economy, １０７: ６６-７８.in Japanese
Yamaguchi, Yoshiyuki. ２０００. Proposal of the Financial Assessment Act, Tokyo: The twenty-first 
Century Policy Forum Japan.in Japanese
Yamakawa, Motonobu, and Eiji Oizumi. ２００２. "A Debate on the Abolition of the Government 
Housing Loan Corporation." Asuka, Journal of Kansai Housing Council of Japan, １０３: ２-１１.in 
Japanese
－71－
	
９２００５
